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Abstract 
This paper aims to examine the determinants of disclosure of individual executive directors’ remuneration in Malaysia. The 
individual disclosure of executive directors’ remuneration was continuously tracked from 2000 to 2008, a period of evolving 
regulatory framework. Using panel logit regression, the study incorporated agency theory, legitimacy theory, signaling theory and 
proprietary costs into the research framework. The multivariate analysis showed that there were significant associations between 
family ownership, government ownership, director ownership, proportion of independent directors, audit quality and company size 
and the disclosure of individual executive director’s remuneration. 
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1. Introduction 
The East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 brought attention to the weakness in the Malaysian corporate governance 
framework.  It led to the introduction of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) in 2001. It was 
recommended that companies disclose individual director’s remuneration and a statement of the principles behind 
remuneration policies. The regulators adopted a ‘hybrid method’ or ‘comply or justify’ method of corporate 
governance in implementation of the MCCG. This gave companies discretionary power on the extent of their 
disclosure. The Bursa Malaysia Listing Rules were also amended to include mandatory disclosure of directors’ 
remuneration by bands.  
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This was followed by the harmonization of Malaysian accounting standards with the International Accounting 
Standards. The Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 2 ‘Share based payments’ was introduced in 2005. It required 
reporting entities to disclose details of executives’ share based payments. The FRS 124 ‘Related party disclosure’ was 
introduced in 1999 and was amended in 2005 to include disclosure of ‘key management personnel’ remuneration. In 
2012, the MCCG was further improved to strengthen the role of the board of directors and audit committees. These 
reforms were introduced to improve the level of transparency and to restore investors’ confidence in the Malaysian 
capital market.  
The adoption of an Anglo-American based corporate governance code in a developing Asian market with 
distinctive ownership and cultural characteristics, provides an interesting avenue in to study the extent and 
effectiveness of disclosure reforms. Luo, Courtenay and Hossain (2006) argued that a disclosure rich environment 
like the US may not capture the influence of the theoretical determinants on the extent of disclosure. Although the 
level of Malaysian executive directors’ remuneration was not as exorbitant as their Western counterparts, there was 
serious concern about the minimal disclosure on remuneration policies and practices in the annual reports (Minority 
Shareholders Watchdog Group, 2011). It was difficult for shareholders to gauge the performance of the executive 
directors’ in working for them and whether their remuneration was fair or excessive.  
This study seeks to address the question on whether the corporate reforms are effective in compelling companies 
to disclose on the individual remuneration of their executive directors. The result of this study will be of interest to 
Malaysian policy makers and shareholders. The results may assist shareholders in examining the adequacy of the 
disclosure of remuneration information in assessing the performance of executive directors’ as their agents. The results 
of the hypothesis testing will also show whether the traditional dominance exerted by the family and the state in the 
Malaysian capital market is present in the adoption of the reforms to the disclosure of individual executive directors’ 
remuneration. The results will also be useful in assessing whether the ‘hybrid method’ of corporate governance 
adopted by the regulators is sufficient to ensure compliance with the MCCG recommendations on the disclosure of 
individual executive directors’ remuneration. If so, regulators may have to adopt a more prescriptive approach to the 
reforms.  
It fills the gaps in existing studies on the disclosure of executives’ remuneration. It extends prior studies by 
integrating the different theoretical perspectives offered by agency theory, legitimacy theory, signalling theory and 
proprietary costs in influencing the level of total, voluntary and individual disclosures of executives’ remuneration. It 
also uses all the theories rather than employing a single theory as the explanatory theory and holding others as control 
variables. In addition, no prior Malaysian studies have examined the likelihood and the determinants of the individual 
disclosure of executive directors’ remuneration following the reforms to the Malaysian regulatory framework. 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
Andjelkovic, Boyle and McNoe (2000) argued that lack of disclosure of remuneration may meant that shareholders 
would not be able to scrutinize remuneration and to demand the board of directors place more emphasis on an 
association between pay and performance. The lack of scrutiny may mean that the board of directors would be lax in 
setting remuneration policies and disciplining executives. They may instead align their interests with those of the 
executives. Subsequently, regulatory reforms were introduced to improve on the level of transparency. Prior studies 
have shown than corporations were resistant to the introduction of requirements to disclose details of executive 
remuneration especially individual remuneration (Andjelkovic, Boyle, & McNoe, 2000; Chizema, 2008; Jinghui & 
Dennis, 2008). This study will investigate whether there was similar resistance to the implementation of the reforms 
in Malaysian capital market and whether the reforms were effective in improving the disclosure of individual executive 
directors’ remuneration.  Earlier Malaysian studies on the corporate reforms had not focused on the disclosure of 
Malaysian executive directors’ remuneration and specifically on the contentious issue of individual remuneration. 
Chizema (2008) argued that the introduction of an Anglo-American corporate governance code that had been 
designed to maximise shareholders value may be resisted by stakeholders such as family owners who significantly 
have control over companies’ directions. A study by Mohd Ghazali and Weetman (2006) examined the influence of 
dominant family and directors’ shareholdings on the level of voluntary disclosure by Malaysian companies after the 
introduction of the MCCG. They found that these variables significantly influenced the level of voluntary disclosure 
despite the changes in disclosure regulations. They attributed this to the highly captive and regulated Malaysian capital 
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market that may not encourage transparency. Disclosure of individual executive director’s remuneration may expose 
potential rent extraction through family related executive directors by dominant family shareholders. This leads to the 
first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: That for Malaysian companies, the probability of disclosure of individual executive director’s 
remuneration is inversely associated with the level of family ownership. 
In Malaysia, government continues to be the main shareholders of a significant number of public listed companies, 
mainly via the government linked investment companies. Eng and Mak (2003) argued that state controlled companies 
disclose more information to manage their agency relationships with minority and other external shareholders. They 
need to assure these shareholders that the government is not diverting the companies’ wealth to national interests 
instead of to shareholders’ return (Shan, 2009). Chizema (2008) argued that state controlled companies need to set 
examples of high compliance with the regulatory framework given that it is the state that initiate it. Therefore, the next 
hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2: That for Malaysian companies, the probability of disclosure of individual executive director’s 
remuneration is positively associated with the level of government ownership. 
Another variable that can be viewed from an agency perspective is foreign ownership. Shan (2009) suggested that 
there are more demands for transparency and accountability by foreign investors and companies have the incentive to 
disclose more information to retain that investment. Foreign owners may also be more accustomed to comprehensive 
disclosure of executive directors’ remuneration in their own countries (Chizema 2008). The third hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis 3: That for Malaysian companies, the probability of disclosure of individual executive director’s 
remuneration is positively associated with the level of foreign ownership. 
Executive directors may have to disclose information to show that they are acting in the best interest of principals 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, the introduction of equity based payments into executive remuneration meant 
that executive directors become part owners.   Executive directors who hold significant ownership interest may not 
act to the best interests’ of their principals (Jensen, Murphy, & Wruck, 2004). They may use their influence to limit 
disclosure of information that may attract attention to their wealth especially their individual remuneration.  Therefore 
the fourth hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 4: That for Malaysian companies, the probability of disclosure of individual executive director’s 
remuneration is inversely associated with the level of executive director ownership. 
The agency relationship between companies and creditors may also influence the disclosure of individual executive 
directors’ remuneration. Creditors may expect that executives may pay themselves excessively rather than paying 
debts. This rational expectation may mean that creditors may limit the extent of financing, charge higher interests or 
impose restrictive debt covenants. Given that creditors are price protected, companies have an incentive to disclose 
their remuneration to limit the costs of the price protection (Chalmers & Godfrey, 2004). The creditors themselves 
can demand more information to assess the extent of compliance with debt covenants (Wallace & Naser, 1995). This 
lead to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: That for Malaysian companies, the probability of disclosure of individual executive director’s 
remuneration is positively associated with the level of debt. 
The reforms in the Malaysian regulatory framework also emphasised on the incorporation of corporate governance 
mechanisms especially on the extent of independence of the board of directors. Independent and non-executive board 
members may act as monitors in mitigating agency problems (Fama, 1980). Independent directors would want to 
protect their credibility and impartiality and thus push for greater disclosure of executives’ remuneration in the annual 
reports (Jinghui & Dennis 2008).  Thus the sixth hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 6: That for Malaysian companies, the probability of disclosure of individual executive director’s 
remuneration is positively associated with the proportion of independent directors on the board. 
Employing prominent external auditors may lend more credibility to companies’ financial reporting. It can show 
that companies are limiting the opportunities for expropriation of private benefits by controlling shareholders. 
Prominent auditors are expected to ensure that managers choose appropriate accounting and disclosure policies that 
would restrict or reveal expropriation of company value (Guedhami & Pittman, 2006). Fan and Wong (2002) found 
that Asian companies with greater agency problems appoint a prominent external auditor. 
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 It has been suggested that bigger audit firms are less sensitive to client demands as that they are not affected by 
bonding relationship between them and the clients (Wallace & Naser, 1995). In addition, bigger audit firms may want 
to protect their reputation or ‘brand name’ by ensuring that their audits are of the highest standards (Bassett, Koh, & 
Tutticci, 2007). The bigger audit firms could demand more comprehensive disclosure in annual reports. Thus, the 
seventh hypothesis states that: 
Hypothesis 7: That for Malaysian companies, the probability of disclosure of individual executive director’s 
remuneration is positively associated with audit quality. 
Social contract theory predicts that companies will seek to ensure their legitimacy by meeting society’s expectations 
(Lindblom, 1983). The threat to legitimacy is greater in larger or more profitable companies. This is consistent with 
the political cost hypothesis that states that these companies will attract more public or political scrutiny than others 
(Watts & Zimmerman, 1978). Most studies of executive remuneration have found that executives in larger companies 
are paid more compared to their counterparts in smaller companies (Core & Guay, 2002; Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, & 
Hinkin, 1987; Hall & Liebman, 1998; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Lewellen, Loderer, Martin, & Blum, 1992; Murphy, 
1985; Smith Jr & Watts, 1992) They attributed this to the fact that larger companies are able to attract and employ 
highly skilled executives with higher pay.  
Given that executive remuneration is a sensitive issue, larger companies can use disclosure to manage the 
perceptions of society that their remuneration schemes are justified and to limit any regulatory interventions (Jinghui 
& Dennis 2008).  Companies might also want to avoid bad publicity if stakeholders discover on their own that the 
executives may have been ‘seemingly’ remunerated excessively. Therefore:  
Hypothesis 8: That for Malaysian companies, the probability of disclosure of individual executive director’s 
remuneration is positively associated with the size of company. 
Executive directors have an incentive to address information asymmetry by voluntarily releasing information to 
the market. Under signalling theory, Lang and Lundholm (1993) and Verrecchia (1983) show that companies were 
better off by releasing both bad and good news to the market to avoid being penalised through over mispricing of 
shares. Companies tend to disclose good news more comprehensively and quicker than bad news (Wallace & Naser 
1995). Executive directors have more incentive to disclose information on improvements than a decrease in the 
association between their individual remuneration and performance. This may signal to the market that the executives 
are working hard for shareholders and deserve their remuneration and further increments.  Therefore: 
Hypothesis 9: That for Malaysian companies, the probability of disclosure of individual executive director’s 
remuneration is positively associated with the performance of a company. 
The final hypothesis observed the association between proprietary costs and the probability of disclosure of 
individual executive director’s remuneration. This study adopts investment growth opportunities as a proxy for 
proprietary costs. Companies with higher growth opportunities have more proprietary information about the 
unexploited and future investment opportunities (Shan 2009). These companies may not want to disclose on their 
executive directors’ individual remuneration for fear of poaching from other competitors who seek to exploit on the 
growth of the companies. Consistent with prior studies, this study represents investment growth opportunities using 
the ratio of market value to the book value of equity. It measures the value of a company represented by the cash flow 
from assets in place and future growth potential (Adam & Goyal, 2008). Therefore:  
Hypothesis 10: That for Malaysian companies, the probability of disclosure of individual executive director’s 
remuneration is inversely associated with the growth of a company. 
3. Methodology 
The sample period between 2000 and 2008 covered the reforms in the regulatory framework for directors’ 
remuneration disclosure. The year 2000 is a benchmark for the effects of the regulatory reforms on the extent of 
disclosure as there was no regulation prior to and during that year. The MCCG and KLSE listing rules on disclosure 
of remuneration by bands first applied in 2001. The FRS 2 ‘Share based payments’ and FRS 124 ‘Related party 
transactions’ were introduced in 2005 and 2006 respectively. The nine year period allows for a learning period so that 
companies can adapt to the reforms.  
After allowing for changes in fiscal years, non-profitable companies and missing observations, a total of 1406 
complete annual reports were collected for the 200 sample companies over the study period. Information on the 
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disclosure of individual executive directors’ remuneration was manually collated from the annual reports. The annual 
reports were read at least twice, given that the information could be disclosed in any parts of the annual reports not 
restricted to the director’s report or corporate governance report.  
A Logit regression analysis was then conducted to examine the association between the explanatory variables and 
the probability that companies may disclose individual executive director’s remuneration. The same method was 
adopted by Chizema (2008) in examining the determinants of disclosure of individual director’s remuneration in 
Germany. 
4. Results and discussion 
The descriptive result showed that a significant number of Malaysian companies did not follow the MCCG 
recommendation of providing disclosure on individual executive director’s remuneration. The study found that only 
11.66% of the sample companies provided disclosure of individual executive director’s remuneration over the period 
of 2000 to 2008. The trend over the years also revealed that initially Malaysian companies showed a positive response 
to the MCCG recommendation. However, towards the end of the sampling period there were lesser companies 
disclosing on individual executive director’s remuneration.  
Although the recommendation to disclose on individual executive director’s remuneration was not mandatory, 
companies were required to provide justifications for non-disclosure. A significant number of the companies used the 
mandatory requirement of the Bursa Malaysia Listing Rule of disclosure of individual director by band of RM50, 000 
as an ‘escape clause’ to their non-adherence to the MCCG.  
For example, Hwang DBS Malaysia Berhad in its annual report of 2007 stated that “The Code recommends 
disclosure of details of the remuneration of each Director. However, the Board is of the view that the disclosure of 
the remuneration of the Directors by bands of RM50, 000 is sufficient to meet the objective of the Code.” In 2006, 
IGB Corporation Berhad justified their non-disclosure by stating that, “For security and confidentiality reasons, the 
details of Directors’ remuneration are not shown with reference to Directors individually. The Board is of the view 
that the transparency and accountability aspects of the corporate governance on Directors’ remuneration are 
appropriately served by the band disclosure made.”  
Table 1 shows the result of the Logit regression on the determinants of individual director’s remuneration. 164 
company years provided disclosure of individual director’s remuneration and 1242 company years did not do so.  The 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) statistics accepts the null hypothesis that this is the best model for the equation (p = 0.0000, α 
= 1%).  
Table 1 Result of Logit regression on the determinants of disclosure of individual executive director’s remuneration 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
C -4.676572 0.905020 -5.167371 0.0000 
FAM_OWN -1.230710 0.460137 -2.674658 0.0075*** 
GOV 1.519131 0.472129 3.217620 0.0013*** 
FORGN_OWN -0.171576 0.452078 -0.379528 0.7043 
DIR_OWN 0.776096 0.464058 1.672412 0.0944* 
DEBT_TO_EQUITY -0.098726 0.060546 -1.630599 0.1030 
PROP_INDDIR 1.281034 0.743901 1.722050 0.0851* 
AQ 0.369831 0.216546 1.707866 0.0877* 
LN_ASSET 0.121251 0.066743 1.816678 0.0693* 
ROE 0.560125 0.736101 0.760935 0.4467 
MARKETOBOOK 0.066795 0.106626 0.626448 0.5310 
McFadden R-squared 0.056600 Obs with Dep=0 1242 
LR statistic 
 
58.78367 Obs with Dep=1 164 
Prob (LR Statistic) 0.000000  
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Consistent with the first hypothesis, the result accepts the hypothesis that family ownership (FAM_OWN) 
significantly limits the probability of disclosure of individual executive director’s remuneration (p=0.0075, α = 1%). 
Disclosure of individual executive director’s remuneration may bring scrutiny of the private wealth derived by family-
managers and family shareholdings. The additional attention may also expose exploitation and rent extraction of 
minority shareholders. Thus, family owners seek to protect their control over the company by limiting the public 
disclosure of individual executive remuneration.  
There was a significant and positive association between the level of government ownership (GOV) and the 
probability that companies will disclose on individual’s remuneration (p=0.0013, α = 1%). The result is consistent 
with the second hypothesis. This indicated that Malaysian government linked companies are at the forefront of 
promoting good corporate governance practices. The result is consistent with Chizema (2008) that also found that 
government ownership in Germany companies significantly improved the probability of disclosure of individual 
director’s remuneration.  
Executive directors’ shareholdings (DIR_OWN) were found to be weak but, significantly and positively improve 
the probability of the disclosure of individual director’s remuneration. This meant that hypothesis three is accepted (α 
= 10%). This is consistent with the expectations of agency theory that equity shareholdings may mitigate agency 
problems among agents. Executive directors may now have the incentive to disclose information on remuneration to 
protect their managerial positions and allow shareholders to assess their performance.  Hence, they would generally 
not resist the disclosure of their individual remuneration.  
In addition, there was also a positive but weak significant association (α = 10%) proportion of independent directors 
(PROP_INDDIR) and the probability of disclosure of individual director’s remuneration. This may indicate that the 
corporate governance mechanism put in place by shareholders is working to a certain extent in protecting their 
interests. However, the independent directors may not be powerful enough in mitigating the traditional dominance of 
family owners in pushing for disclosure of individual remuneration. 
There is also a weak significant and positive association between audit quality (AQ) and the likelihood of disclosure 
on individual executive director’s remuneration (α = 10%). Nonetheless, the result is consistent with hypothesis seven 
that states that companies with higher audit quality are positively associated with the extent of disclosure of executive 
directors’ remuneration. Clarkson et al. (2006) and Bassett et al. (2007) found a similar association between audit 
quality and the level of voluntary and mandatory disclosure of remuneration in Australian companies. 
Hypothesis eight stated that the likelihood of disclosure of individual executive directors’ remuneration increases 
with the size of company (LN_ASSET). The result of the analysis supported this (p=0.0693). Company legitimacy 
may be threatened if the public perceives that they are paying excessive remuneration without justification. Companies 
have an incentive to manage the perceptions of society by disclosing sufficient information about their remuneration 
schemes (Jinghui & Dennis, 2008). The threat to legitimacy may be greater for larger companies because they are 
more visible and dependent on society’s approval for their continuance (Hagerman & Zmijewski, 1979). Furthermore, 
larger companies have been shown to pay their executives more and are more susceptible to public and political 
scrutiny.  
Hypotheses three, five, nine and ten were found not to be significant and thus were not accepted. Foreign ownership 
(FORGN_OWN) and creditors (DEBT_TO_EQUITY) may not have significant influence to overcome the dominance 
shown by family related shareholders to demand individual disclosure of executive director’s remuneration. The result 
also showed that signaling theory (ROE) and proprietary cost (MARKETOBOOK) were not associated with the 
probability of disclosure of individual executive director’s remuneration. It appears that agency theory variables are 
the significant factors that drove the likelihood of individual disclosure of executive director’s remuneration. 
5. Conclusion 
Overall, the result showed that it is imperative for regulators to remove the inconsistencies between the MCCG and 
the Bursa Malaysia Listing Rules. The mandatory requirements of the Listing Rule to disclose remuneration according 
to bands provided an ‘escape route’ for companies not wanting to disclose individual executive director’s 
remuneration as it was only voluntary under the MCCG. The disclosure of individual remuneration would provide 
more information to investors than mere disclosure by bands. This is especially important in assessing the performance 
of the executive directors as agents for the shareholders. If the MCCG was maintained at a voluntary level, greater 
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enforcement would be needed to ensure that companies provided valid and comprehensive statements to justify 
departures from the recommendations of the MCCG. 
The introduction of the MCCG and reforms to the accounting standards did not weaken the traditional influence of 
family shareholdings over Malaysian companies’ disclosure policies. The analysis showed that family shareholdings 
significantly hampered the likelihood of the disclosure of individual executive directors’ remuneration. Creditors and 
foreign owners were not strong enough to mitigate the level of dominance by family shareholders. This may suggest 
that family owners view disclosure of individual executive directors’ remuneration as sensitive information that may 
threatened their control over the companies. Extensive disclosure on executive remuneration, especially on individual 
director’s remuneration may expose exploitation of minority shareholders and the consumption of private benefits by 
family managers.  However, the presence of government shareholdings provided a positive role in enhancing the 
probability of disclosure of individual executive director’s remuneration. This warrants further examination given the 
Malaysian government current strategy of divestment in a significant number of Malaysian government linked 
companies. 
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